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Normalisation of ‘preventive’ non-trial-based executive measures? From 
detention without trial to control orders, to TPIMs and ETPIMs: 
interrogating the ‘checking’ role of the ECHR  
'Designing ETPIMS around ECHR Review or Normalisation of 
“Preventive” Non-Trial-Based Executive Measures?' 
 
Professor Helen Fenwick* 
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Abstract 
 
This article considers the transition in 2012 from control orders to more ECHR-compliant 
‘terrorism prevention and investigation measures’ under the Terrorism Prevention and 
Investigation Measures Act 2011. It argues that the interaction between security and liberty 
over the post 9/11 years has the appearance of a dialogue between courts and the executive 
that has resulted in a diminution in the repressive character of non-trial based preventive 
measures. But such an impression, it will be contended, is obscuring the recalibration of 
ECHR rights that has occurred, easing the path to the introduction of the enhanced version of 
TPIMs, under the Enhanced Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures Bill. The 
proposed ETPIMs exhibit many of the objectionable features of control orders and are 
currently ready to introduce if the threat level rises. 
 
Introduction 
 
The twelve years that have passed since the catastrophic terrorist strike of 9/11 have seen a 
complex, apparently dialogic, interaction between human rights and non-trial based counter-
terrorist measures in the UK. That interaction has led to modification of such measures, 
seeing detention without trial give way to control orders, which in turn were superseded by 
terrorism prevention and investigation measures under the Terrorism Prevention and 
Investigation Measures Act 2011 (TPIMA). But the inception of the more ECHR-compliant 
TPIMA was rapidly followed by the introduction of the Enhanced Terrorism Prevention and 
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Investigation Measures Bill (ETPIM Bill),
1
 providing for enhanced measures, similar in 
terms of their more repressive character to control orders, but accompanied by somewhat 
greater safeguards, and ready to be introduced as emergency legislation. The nature of these 
two instruments, their ECHR-compliance, and the implications of introducing ETPIMs in 
reliance on the domestic control orders jurisprudence, form the subject of this commentary. 
 
TPIMA makes provision in s26 to introduce the enhanced measures if it is urgent to do so 
when Parliament is in recess,
2
 but the ETPIM Bill would allow the measures to be relied on 
generally in future. It appears to have been introduced, as discussed below, on the basis that 
in certain circumstances TPIMs might not be viewed as adequate to meet the demands of a 
heightened security threat, so ETPIMs could be needed as a supplementary measure. The Bill 
has received parliamentary scrutiny
3
 and is available to be brought forward at any time to meet 
the demands of an unspecified crisis situation; the trigger that would allow it to be enacted is 
not indicated in the Bill.
4
 If passed, it would grant the Home Secretary additional powers to 
deal with exceptional circumstances, and ETPIMs would provide a separate, parallel regime 
running alongside the TPIMs scheme. The ETPIM Bill has so far attracted little academic 
attention,
5
 but it is in many respects a disturbing, even extraordinary, legislative measure.  
 
TPIMs, introduced from 2012 onwards, represented, this commentary will argue, a more 
favourable compromise between protecting both security and liberty than control orders had 
done, but the enhanced version, in contrast, may reintroduce the human rights challenges they 
presented. This article identifies a trend post 9/11 towards ‘business as usual’ in human rights 
                                                 
 
*Professor of Law, Durham University. My thanks are due to the anonymous referees for their helpful 
comments.  
1
 See Draft Enhanced Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures Bill Home Office, Report Cm 8166 
(2011). 
2
 Section 26 (1) provides ‘If the Secretary of State considers that it is necessary to do so by reason of urgency, 
the Secretary of State may make a temporary enhanced Terrorism Prevention and Investigation order [while 
Parliament is in recess]’. An order made under s26 is made on the same basis and provides for certain of the 
same obligations as an order that could be made under the ETPIM Bill, as discussed below. No temporary 
ETPIMs have yet been introduced under s26. For consideration of s26 see eg TPIM Bill 2
nd
 Reading per Lord 
Hunt, HC Deb vol 730, col 1139 5 October 2011. 
3
 The ETPIM Bill Joint Committee was set up for this purpose; see ‘Draft Enhanced Terrorism Prevention and 
Investigation Measures Bill,’ First Report, HL 70, HC 495, 27 November 2012. 
4
 ibid 3. It is to be introduced in response to ‘exceptional circumstances’ which ‘cannot be managed by any 
other means’. The circumstances are discussed below.  
5
 C. Walker & A. Horne have considered TPIMA in ‘The Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures Act 
2011: ‘One Thing but Not Much the Other?’ (2012) 6 Crim LR 421, but since TPIMA is the subject, the article 
only devotes about two pages to ETPIMs: 427-428. 
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terms and to a ‘normalisation’ of crisis measures. It argues that the interaction between 
security and liberty over the post 9/11 years has the appearance of a dialogue between courts 
and the executive
6
 that has resulted in a diminution in the repressive character of non-trial 
based measures.
7
 But such an impression, it will be contended, is obscuring the recalibration 
of ECHR rights that has occurred, easing the path to the introduction of ETPIMs which 
exhibit many of the objectionable features of control orders. Thus, the complacent idea that 
ETPIMs are embedded in a process of reanimation of human rights norms
 
 requires forceful 
interrogation. 
 
The changing nature of ‘emergency’ executive non-trial-based measures post 
9/11 
 
In order to seek to demonstrate that a movement towards normalisation of ‘preventive’ non-
trial-based measures
8
 has occurred, it is suggested that three phases, broadly speaking, could 
be identified in the post-9/11 response in the UK. In the first, in the immediate aftermath of 
the strike, the appearance of a fundamental clash between security and liberty arose due to the 
legal reaction to the crisis, which in the UK included detention without trial under Part IV of 
the Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001 for suspect non-nationals, necessitating 
derogation from Article 5 ECHR. At that point the idea that human rights should merely 
continue to be adhered to was condemned as naïve or quixotic,
9
 or as a ‘gamble with people’s 
                                                 
6
 On dialogic theory see P. Yap, ‘Defending Dialogue’ [2012] PL  527. 
7
 See generally: H. Fenwick & G. Phillipson, ‘Covert Derogations and Judicial Deference: Redefining Liberty 
and Due Process in Counter Terrorism Law and Beyond’ (2011) 56(4) McGill LJ 864; C. Gearty, ‘The Human 
Rights Act: An Academic Sceptic Changes His Mind but Not His Heart’ (2010) 6 EHRLR 582, 585-6. 
8
 See generally for discussion of ‘preventive’ measures in the UK: L. Zedner, ‘Preventive Justice or Pre-
punishment? The Case of Control Orders’ (2007) 60 CLP 174; C. Walker, Terrorism and the Law (Oxford: 
OUP, 2011) Ch 7. See generally as regards preventive measures: J. Paust, ‘Survey of Possible Responses to 
International Terrorism, Prevention, Punishment and Cooperative Action’ (1975) 5(2) Georgia Journal of 
International and Comparative Law 431; P. Ruddock, ‘Law as a Preventative Weapon Against Terrorism’ in A. 
Lynch, E. Macdonald & G. Williams (eds), Law and Liberty in the War on Terror (Sydney: The Federation 
Press, 2008); S.B. Elias, ‘Rethinking “Preventive Detention” from a Comparative Perspective: Three 
Frameworks for Detaining Terrorist Suspects’ (2010) 41 Columbia Human Rights Law Review 99. The use of 
such preventative measures and interest in introducing them has been apparent post 9/11 in various countries: see, as 
regards Australia, the Criminal Code Act 1995, para 104.2, 104.3, introduced by the Anti-Terrorism Act (No 2) 
2005. In Canada they have been introduced in the form of security certificates: Immigration and Refugee 
Protection Act 2001, ss 77, 81.  
9
 For example, the then Prime Minister Tony Blair repeatedly attacked the ‘barmy’ decisions of the Special 
Immigration Appeals Commission  (SIAC) on deportation of non-national suspected terrorists, and threatened to 
use legislation to undermine the outcome: see M. Elliot, ‘The War on Terror and the United Kingdom’s 
Constitution’ (2007) 1 European Journal of Legal Studies 1, 14-16. See also Tony Blair’s famous comment 
nearly a month after the 7/7 attacks: ‘[l]et no one be in any doubt, the rules of the game are changing’ (S. 
Jeffery, ‘The Rules of the Game’ the Guardian, 5 August 2005, at 
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safety’.10 The demand that a deferential judicial approach should be taken when the derogation 
was challenged sought to stifle dialogue,
11
 relying instead on acceptance of an imperative to 
accommodate executive measures designed to enhance security.
12
  
 
In A and Others v Secretary of State for the Home Dept,
13
 the House of Lords determined in 
effect that the government had failed to show that continued adherence to Article 5 was 
impossible even in the face of a ‘war on terror’. The derogation order was quashed and the Part 
IV scheme declared incompatible with Articles 5 and 14 ECHR.  Once the scheme was 
abandoned the preventive strategy nevertheless re-emerged in the form of control orders 
under the Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005 (PTA).
14
 But their repressive nature indicated 
implicit reliance on a recalibrated version of Article 5, able to accommodate to the needs of 
the crisis.
15
 Although the courts’ response meant that the control orders’ scheme had to be 
modified to achieve greater ECHR-compatibility, albeit this time without rejecting it 
wholesale,
16
 the courts partially acquiesced, it will be argued, in the notion of such 
                                                                                                                                                        
http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2005/aug/05/july7.uksecurity5 (last visited 28 April 2013). As Bruce Ackerman 
puts it: ‘No democratic government can maintain popular support without acting effectively to calm panic and to 
prevent a second terrorist strike. If respect for civil liberties requires governmental paralysis, serious politicians 
will not hesitate before sacrificing rights to the war against terrorism. They will only gain popular applause by 
brushing civil libertarian objections aside as quixotic’: ‘The Emergency Constitution’ (2004) 113(5) Yale LJ 
1029, 1029. 
10
 See I. Loader, ‘The Cultural Lives of Security and Rights’ in B. Goold & L. Lazarus (eds), Security and 
Human Rights (Portland, OR: Hart, 2007) 27, 39. 
11
 For example, the Secretary of State argued in A and Others v Secretary of State for the Home Dept  [2005] 2 
WLR 087, as regards the claim that Part 4 of the Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001 (ACTSA) 
breached the Article 14 rights of the appellants, that the standard of review was whether ‘it was legitimately 
open to the primary decision-makers to draw the dividing line where they did’ [86]. The key argument on behalf 
of the government was: ‘As it was for Parliament and the Executive to assess the threat facing the nation, so it 
was for those bodies and not the courts to judge the response necessary to protect the security of the public. 
These were matters…calling for an exercise of political and not judicial judgment…’ [107].   
12
 In relation to judicial responses T Poole terms this model one of ‘deferential accommodation’, finding that 
within it judges are prepared to ‘accommodate executive needs by recognising a broad area of largely 
untrammelled executive discretion:’ ‘Courts and Conditions of Uncertainty in “Times of Crisis”’ [2008] PL 234, 
238.  
13
 [2005] 2 AC 68. See for discussion: A. Tomkins, ‘Readings of A v Secretary of State for the Home 
Department’ [2005] PL 259; T. Hickman, ‘Between Human Rights and the Rule of Law: Indefinite Detention 
and the Derogation Model of Constitutionalism’ (2005) 68 MLR 655. 
14
 For a detailed account of the control orders regime see generally: C. Walker, ‘Keeping Control of Terrorists 
Without Losing Control of Constitutionalism’ (2007) 59 Stanford Law Review 1395. 
15
 See the discussion of early ‘heavy touch’ control orders below. See also H. Fenwick, ‘Recalibrating ECHR 
Rights, and The Role of The Human Rights Act Post 9/11: Reasserting International Human Rights Norms in 
the “War On Terror”?’ (2010) 63 CLP 153. Under Poole’s view such accommodation does not involve the overt 
suspension of constitutional norms or an extensive use of the concept of non-justiciability; rather, it involves an 
attitude of extreme deference in relation to the executive view of measures needed to combat risk: n 12 above. 
Oren Gross takes a somewhat similar view in speaking of an ‘emergency interpretation’ of the US Constitution 
as opposed to an explicit suspension of it, meaning that constitutional limitations can be redefined in order to 
seek to overcome the emergency rapidly: ‘Chaos and Rules: Should Responses to Violent Crises Always Be 
Constitutional?’ (2003) 112 Yale LJ 1011, 1064. 
16
 See in particular Secretary of State for the Home Department v AP [2010] 3 WLR 51, discussed below.  
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accommodation. However, a process of reanimation of the rights via court action did occur,
17
 
meaning that the scheme itself became in various respects, less repressive.
18
 To an extent, the 
control orders scheme incrementally accommodated Article 5 rather than the other way 
round.
19
  
 
The control orders saga could therefore be characterised as representing a new phase in 
dialogic terms, during which a scheme in 2005 compatible with the ECHR only on the basis 
of presupposing a narrow interpretation of Article 5,
20
 was transmuted into a modified 
version of itself by 2011 that came closer to achieving such compatibility. However, in terms 
of its impact the dialogue, it is argued, had a ‘negative suppressive quality’21 in the sense that 
since significant interferences with liberty
22
 without trial had been accepted by the courts as 
compatible with Article 5, such interferences could then be viewed as having received 
judicial imprimatur. That process of an apparent return to ‘business as usual’ in human rights’ 
terms might be said then to have led to the third, current phase in which preventive measures 
appear to have become ‘normalised’. The modifications of control orders, directed towards 
compliance with Article 5, meant that their abandonment
23
 and the transition in 2012 to still 
more Article 5-compliant TPIMs under the Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures 
Act 2011 was of a less dramatic nature than the Coalition government has claimed. The 
introduction of TPIMs as ‘softened’24 control orders apparently formed part of a process of 
reaffirming a commitment to liberty under the government post-2010.
25
 That might also be 
said of the abandonment of the very broad power of suspicion-less stop and search under s44 
                                                 
17
 See in particular the decisions in Secretary of State for the Home Department v JJ [2007] 3 WLR 642; A v 
United Kingdom (2009) 49 EHRR 29 (Grand Chamber) and Secretary of State for the Home Department v AF 
(No 3) [2007] 3 WLR 681. See for general discussion Fenwick, n 15 above. 
18
 See eg Secretary of State for the Home Department v B and C [2010] 1 WLR 1542.  
19
 Fenwick n 15 above, 198-199.  
20
 This was apparent in relation to the early control orders which were then found to create a deprivation of 
liberty under Article 5: Secretary of State for the Home Department v JJ [2007] 3 WLR 642 (discussed below).  
21
 Fenwick & Phillipson n 7, 916; See generally as regards idea of dialogue K. Roach, The Supreme Court on 
Trial: Judicial Activism or Democratic Dialogue (Toronto: Irwin Law, 2001).  
22
 They included some acceptance of up to 16 hours a day house detention: Secretary of State for the Home 
Department v JJ [2007] 3 WLR 642 [105]. This could be combined with forced relocation where no special 
features particularly ‘destructive of family life’ arose: Secretary of State for the Home Department v AP [2011] 
3 WLR 53 [19]-[24].  
23
 Both Houses of Parliament voted to renew Control Orders for another year in 2010 despite a highly critical 
report on renewal from the JCHR (‘Counter-Terrorism Policy and Human Rights’ HL 64, HC 395 (2010)) 
pointing to the grave incursions into human rights norms they represented. See also HC Deb vol 717 col 506 1 
March 2010, and HL Deb vol 717 col 1545 3 March 2010.  In March 2011 Parliament voted to renew the PTA 
until December 2011. TPIMA, s1 also provided for repeal of the PTA.  
24
 See Walker & Horne n 5, 437.  
25
 See HC Deb vol 524 col 205, 1 March 2011. See further eg: K. McVeigh, ‘Nick Clegg Scraps Control Orders’ 
The Guardian, 2 January 2011, at http://www.guardian.co.uk/politics/2011/jan/02/nick-clegg-scrap-control-
orders (last visited 28 April 2013). 
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Terrorism Act 2000 (TA)
26
 which was replaced by sections 60-63 of the Protection of 
Freedoms Act 2012.
27
 
  
Superficially it appeared that as 9/11 receded a more measured assessment of the threat 
occurred, conducive of a return to normality and a re-balancing in favour of human rights, 
largely through court action, but with some Parliamentary intervention. The process could be 
viewed as a classic movement in public law terms, but so doing could aid in enabling 
repressive measures to creep in under the radar – as arguably has occurred in respect of 
ETPIMs – and in removing the spotlight from the prolonged use of ‘emergency’ measures. 
The government took the stance in relation to the TPIM and ETPIM legislation that the 
principles underlying non-trial based interference with liberty and use of closed material 
proceedings, had been accorded a clean bill of human rights health by the courts during the 
control orders saga.
28
 This was put forcibly to parliamentary committees scrutinising the 
legislation, partly via the use of ‘ECHR memos’29 – in general supportive of dialogue, but in 
this instance, it is argued, partially mis-used – and the way was paved for the continued 
reliance on such measures, including the repressive turn taken in the form of ETPIMs.
30
 The 
‘checking’ role of the ECHR gave way, to an extent, to a ratification role, as this commentary 
will argue, which itself fosters accommodationism in an insidious manner.    
 
Purpose of the TPIMs and ETPIMs schemes  
 
                                                 
26
 Repealed under Protection of Freedoms Act 2012, s 59. 
27
 Section 61 inserted s 47A into the TA, creating a more tightly worded power. It might also be noted that a 
consultation on Sched 7 TA has occurred which might lead to reform of that heavily executive-dominated 
process to create clearer human rights compliance, although no commitment to such reform is as yet evident. 
See: ‘Review of the Operation of Schedule 7 Terrorism Act 2000 A public consultation’ Home Office, 
September 2012, at 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/157896/consultation-
document.pdf (last visited 28 April 2013). 
28
 See in particular, ‘Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures Bill’ Memorandum on ECHR, Home 
Office, at https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/98372/echr-
memorandum.pdf (last visited 28 April 2013); see also Draft Enhanced Terrorism Prevention and Investigation 
Measures Bill Home Office, Report Cm 8536 (2013) para 22. 
29
 ibid; see also ‘Draft Enhanced Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures Bill’ Memorandum on 
ECHR, Home Office , at 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/98426/echr-etpim-
memorandum.pdf (last visited 28 April 2013). Also see the Joint Committee on Human Rights (JCHR) 16
th
 
Report ‘Legislative Scrutiny: Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures Bill’ HL 180, HC 1482 (2011).  
30
 See ETPIM Bill Joint Committee ‘Oral Evidence taken before the Committee’ 11 July 2012, HC 495-i per 
Anderson: ‘[the ETPIM Bill] seems very familiar to something that has been litigated with great intensity for 
years on end [control orders] and that operates…perhaps not with complete fairness but about as fairly as a 
measure of this kind could operate’ (Answer to Q8). 
7 
 
Post 9/11 the rise of ‘neighbour’ or ‘home grown’ terrorism in the UK became more 
apparent.
31
 Thus measures suitable for use against nationals deemed a security risk where 
prosecution is viewed as problematic,
32
 or – more rarely – against non-nationals,33 continue 
to be perceived as necessary.
34
 Since the model used for control orders had not been found in 
itself to breach Article 5, as it apparently had the ability to impose restrictions falling just outside 
Article 5(1), which were credited with success in security terms,
35
 it was continued under the 
Coalition government with modifications, in the form of TPIMs and ETPIMs. Continued use of 
preventive non-trial-based measures had received the support of the Counter-terror Review 
2011.
36
 
 
                                                 
31
 For example, British nationals perpetrated the 7/7 bombing. See A.J. Beutel, ‘Radicalization and Homegrown 
Terrorism in Western Muslim Communities’ Minaret of Freedom Institute, 30 August 2007, Section II, 
http://www.minaret.org/MPAC%20Backgrounder.pdf (last visited 28 April 2013); Walker, n 14 above, 1398-
1399. ‘Home-grown’ terrorism may currently be linked to a change in strategy by Al Qaeda and linked groups, 
whereby more spectacular, complex operations that can be fairly readily detected by Western intelligence 
agencies are to be abandoned in favour of more minor strikes by small groups against soft targets such as high 
profile sporting events or shopping centres, where security is weak. See eg Robert Crilly, ‘…recent issues 
of Inspire, a magazine published by al-Qaeda..have carried advice and guidance for “lone wolf” attackers …in 
the form of excerpts from a book by Abu Mus’ab Al-Suri, a prominent theologian and strategist within the al-
Qaeda movement…who has promoted the idea of using isolated cells made up of Muslims already inside the 
country’ (‘Who’s behind the Boston Bombing?’ the Telegraph 16 April 2013, at 
http://blogs.telegraph.co.uk/news/robcrilly/100212312/whos-behind-the-boston-bombing/ (last visited 28 April 
2013)). Recent foiled terrorist activity, including planned attacks, in Luton, Rochdale and  Yorkshire in 2013 
appears to have been of that type; see eg J. Kelly, ‘Birmingham Men Guilty of Mass Bomb Plot’ BBC News, 21 
February 2013, at http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-21534048  (last visited 28 April 2013), ‘Luton terror plot: four 
Jailed  over plan to bomb army centre.’ the Guardian 18 April 2013, at 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2013/apr/18/luton-terror-plot-four-jailed (last visited 28 April 2013). 
32
 Prosecutions are viewed as problematic partly because security material would have to be presented in a 
criminal trial, which might jeopardise operations, put informers at risk or breach agreements with other Security 
Services. See: TPIMA 2011 Explanatory Notes para 15; Fenwick & Phillipson n 7 above, 912. 
33
 Detention/imposition of strict bail conditions followed by deportation and attempts at deportation, with 
assurances where necessary, provides an alternative non-trial-based process in relation to suspect non-nationals. 
Detention or stringent bail conditions can be imposed if deportation can be seen as imminent, while assurances 
are negotiated, since the exception under Art 5(1)(f) ECHR is viewed as applicable: R (on the application of 
Hardial Singh) v Governor of Durham Prison [1984] WLR 704. See in relation to deportation with executive 
assurances where a breach of Art 3 might occur in the receiving country RB (Algeria) v Secretary of State for 
the Home Department [2009] 2 WLR 512; also Othman v UK  (2012) 55 EHRR 1. See further C. Walker, ‘The 
Treatment of Foreign Terrorist Suspects’ (2007) 70 MLR 427. 
34
 According to David Anderson QC, Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation, 10 persons are currently 
subject to TPIMs of whom 9 are British citizens; see ‘Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures in 2012’ 
First Report, March 2013, paras 4.1-4.17, at 
http://terrorismlegislationreviewer.independent.gov.uk/publications/first-report-tpims?view=Binary (last visited 
28 April 2013). 
35
 See Anderson ‘Control Orders in 2011,’ Final Report, March 2012, paras 6.7-6.8; at http://www.official-
documents.gov.uk/document/other/9780108511417/9780108511417.pdf (last visited 28 April 2013); see also as 
regard TPIMs, ‘TPIMS in 2012’, n 34 above, para 11.7. See also Lord Carlile of Berriew QC ‘Sixth Report of 
the Independent Reviewer Pursuant to s14(3) of the Prevention of Terrorism Act 2006’, 6 February 2011, para 
13. 
36
 See the government review of counter-terrorism powers: Review of Counter-Terrorism and Security Powers 
Home Office, Report Cm 8004 (2011) which concluded that control orders should be abandoned but such 
measures should be maintained, and that an enhanced version – which emerged in the form of ETPIMs – might also 
be needed to meet an emergency: (para 30(v)).  See also ETPIM Bill Joint Committee, n 3, para 80. 
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This model has often been termed preventive as opposed to punitive,
37
 in the sense that it relies 
on targeting terrorist suspects to curtail their liberty without the need for a trial, by imposing 
specific restrictions on them, related to the particular types of activity it is thought that they 
might engage in, with the aim of preventing future terrorist activity before it occurs. Since 
reliance on TPIMs/ETPIMs has essentially the same purpose as control orders had, both TPIMA 
and the ETPIM Bill rely heavily on the control orders model: so the legal design of both 
instruments is similar in a range of respects
38
 since both measures have the same ‘preventive’ 
aim.  
 
The more repressive ETPIMs appear to be designed to address a heightened threat. They 
could be used against any terrorism suspect, as discussed below. More specifically, nine 
suspects who had been subjected to control orders were transferred onto TPIMs at the 
beginning of January 2012
39
 and they will come to the end of their TPIMs at the end of 
December 2013. The question will be whether certain suspects, deemed especially high 
risk,
40
 should be subjected to no constraint or to an ETPIMs notice
41
 if they are still perceived 
as presenting a threat to security.
42
 If the ETPIMs Bill is introduced the enhanced measures 
provide the opportunity of imposing greater restraint on such suspects, thereby providing a 
solution of sorts to the problem for another two years (till end December 2015). That 
possibility could provide a rationale for introducing the ETPIMs Bill, as David Anderson QC 
has acknowledged.
43
 The case could also be made that the powers available under a TPIMs 
notice are insufficient in relation to particular suspects. The basis on which Parliament might 
be asked to accept the introduction of the Bill remains uncertain
44
 and does not exclude the 
possibility that a trigger circumstance might arise if the security service advice was that it 
was not acceptable for certain of the suspects currently under TPIMs to be able to move 
                                                 
37
 See further n 8 above. 
38
 The ETPIM Bill also relies heavily on the 2011 Act: a large number of the sections of TPIMA are also applied 
to ETPIMs (under clause 3 ETPIM Bill): ss4-16, 17(1) and (2), 18, 22-24, Scheds 2-6. 
39
 See Anderson ‘TPIMs in 2012’ n 34 above, paras 4.1-4.17. 
40
 Anderson ibid found that certain suspects were at the very high end of risk, even by the standards of 
international terrorism: para 4.12. 
41
 Or to a new TPIMs one, but in that case only if fresh terrorism-related activity is reasonably believed to be 
present. 
42
 So long as the threshold for the imposition of ETPIMs – on the balance of probabilities – is met. It may be 
noted that Anderson (n 34 above, para 11.33-11.38) has argued that the probation service and services provided 
as part of the government's counter terror Prevent strategy should be relied on more heavily in relation to TPIM 
subjects in terms of de-radicalisation. 
43
 See above n 30, 6 (‘if you had…people who are assessed to be very dangerous, coming to the end of a two-
year TPIM…that would be one such situation [in which the ETPIM Bill would be enacted]’).  
44
 See text to n 4, and the government response to the report of the ETPIM Committee, n 28, paras 2-6.  
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freely around the country or meet with certain associates when their two-year period is up, 
where surveillance would not meet the heightened threat or would require resources to do so 
that were not available.
45
 The leeway, discussed below, under the ETPIM Bill for transferring 
such suspects to an ETPIM from a TPIM, may contradict the notion that ETPIMs are 
reserved only for a new crisis situation.  
     
Imposition of TPIMs and ETPIMs 
 
TPIMs and ETPIMs can be imposed by the Home Secretary
46
 on an individual if certain 
conditions are met, and then subjected to review by a court.
47
 Those conditions (A to E) are set 
out at sections 3(1)-(6) TPIMA and, with some changes, in clause 2 ETPIM Bill.
48
 Under 
section 3(1) TPIMA the standard of proof required under Condition A is low: it relies on asking 
only whether ‘the Secretary of State  reasonably believes that the individual is, or has been, 
involved in terrorism-related activity’ (TRA).49 This is a slightly higher standard than that which 
was required for control orders under the PTA, which relied only on the ‘reasonable grounds for 
suspicion’ standard. However, in practice it appears that the higher level of suspicion is not 
likely to make a significant difference to the ability of the Home Secretary to impose TPIM 
                                                 
45
 It may be noted that Anderson in his review of control orders in 2011 found that the government had decided 
to make up for the lack of a relocation requirement in TPIMA by according extra funding for surveillance, in 
order to avoid increasing the risk in national security terms: Anderson ‘Control Orders in 2011,’ n 35,  para 
6.35. He found that the increased budget for surveillance did not fully solve the problem: ‘surveillance – which 
begins and ends with observation – is not a complete substitute for disruptive measures such as relocation’.  
46
 Under TPIMA, s 2(1) : ‘The Secretary of State may by notice (a “TPIM notice”) impose specified terrorism 
prevention and investigation measures on an individual if conditions A to E are met’. Essentially the same 
wording is used in the ETPIM Bill, cl 1.  
47
 Under TPIMA, s 9(2) (discussed below) the court, on the full hearing on the order, has to decide whether the 
Secretary of State’s decision is ‘flawed’, applying judicial review principles, which include compliance with 
Convention rights. This echoes the position regarding control orders, and will apply to ETPIMs (ETPIM Bill, cl 
3 applies TPIMA, ss 4-16 to ETPIMs). 
48
 Since temporary ETPIMs can be imposed under TPIMA, s 26 the provisions governing their use reflect those 
changes now also contained in the ETPIM Bill: s26(6) ‘The provision of a temporary enhanced TPIM order 
which corresponds to section 3 must include appropriate variations from the provision contained in that 
section…’. 
49
 Terrorism-related activity is defined in TPIMA, s 4(1); the definition is very broad, as under the PTA. It 
covers inter alia encouragement of the preparation of such acts: ‘involvement in terrorism related activity is any 
one or more of the following (a) the commission, preparation or instigation of acts of terrorism; (b) conduct 
which facilitates the commission, preparation or instigation of such acts, or which is intended to do so; (c) 
conduct which gives encouragement to the commission, preparation or instigation of such acts, or which is 
intended to do so; (d) conduct which gives support or assistance to individuals who are known or believed by 
the individual concerned to be involved in conduct falling within (a)-(c) and for the purposes of this subsection 
it is immaterial whether the acts of terrorism in question are specific acts of terrorism or acts of terrorism 
generally.’ Under s 4(2) it is immaterial whether the involvement in the activity took place before or after the 
passing of TPIMA. Under both PTA, s 15(1) and TPIMA, s 30(1) ‘terrorism’ has the same meaning as in the 
Terrorism Act 2000 s 1(1).  
10 
 
notices.
50
 Condition B, discussed below, concerns the (misleading) requirement that the 
terrorist activity in question must be ‘new’ to impose the measure. Condition E requires 
imposition of a TPIM (or ETPIM) by a court unless the case is deemed urgent
51
 – as will 
normally be the case. Under section 3(3) TPIMA. Condition C  is that the Secretary of State 
reasonably considers that it is necessary for a TPIM to be imposed ‘for purposes connected with 
protecting members of the public from a risk of terrorism’. Condition D (section 3(4)) provides 
that the Secretary of State must reasonably consider that it is necessary for the specified 
terrorism prevention and investigation measures to be imposed on the individual ‘for purposes 
connected with preventing or restricting the individual’s involvement in terrorism-related 
activity’.52  
 
In Secretary of State for the Home Department v CC, CF
53
 it was confirmed that the 
requirement in TPIMA of showing reasonable belief imposes a higher threshold than that 
which previously applied under the PTA. Reliance was placed on A and Others v Secretary of 
State for the Home Department
54
 in which Laws LJ said: ‘Belief is a state of mind by which 
the person in question thinks that X is the case. Suspicion is a state of mind by which the 
person in question thinks that X may be the case’.55 In Secretary of State for Home 
Department v BM,
56
 and in CC, CF, the argument was rejected that under TPIMA the 
standard of proof is higher than ‘the reasonable belief’ standard in that the foundation of past 
facts upon which the belief is predicated must be proved on the balance of probabilities.
57
   
 
                                                 
50
 All the suspects at that time on control orders were transferred to TPIMs, so the material supporting the level 
of suspicion previously applicable was also deemed to be sufficient under the slightly higher standard: see 
ETPIM Bill Joint Committee n 3, 7. On the other hand, police evidence is apparently to the effect that certain 
suspects who had not been subjected to control orders were not placed on TPIM notices due to this higher 
standard of proof: Anderson ‘TPIMs in 2012,’ n 34 above, para 2.23. 
51
 Condition E (in both instruments, but in ETPIM Bill, cl 2) is that the court must give permission for the 
imposition of the TPIM, but under s 3(5)(b) (clause 2(5)(b) ETPIM Bill) permission is not needed if the 
Secretary of State ‘reasonably considers’ that the case is urgent. 
52
 It may be noted that the term ‘purposes connected with’ slightly dilutes the requirement for control orders that 
each obligation imposed had to be considered necessary for the purpose of protecting the public from a risk of 
terrorism. 
53
 [2012] EWHC 2837. 
54
 [2005] 1 WLR 414. 
55
 ibid [229]; R v Saik [2006] 2 WLR 993 was also referred to, in which Lord Brown observed that ‘to suspect 
something to be so is by no means to believe it to be so: it is to believe only that it may be so’ [120]. 
56
 [2012] 1 WLR 2734. 
57
 ibid at [25]. It was found in BM, which was relied on in CC,CF, that ‘to found a reasonable belief that a 
subject is or has been involved in TRA and that a TPIM is necessary does not involve the requirement to 
establish involvement in specific TRA to any higher standard than that which can properly give rise to such a 
belief. No doubt some facts which go to forming the belief will be clearly established, others may be based on 
an assessment of the various pieces of evidence available’ [34]. 
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Under the ETPIM Bill, Conditions B,C,E, as indicated, are similar. Under Condition A the 
standard of proof is somewhat higher: the Secretary of State must be satisfied on ‘the balance of 
probabilities that the individual is, or has been, involved in terrorism-related activity’,58 
reflecting the more onerous obligations that can be imposed under an ETPIM notice. (This 
standard is also required for imposition of temporary ETPIMs under section 26 of the 
TPIMA.) Although ETPIMs are potentially more repressive, the seriousness of the TRA itself 
appears to be irrelevant. The only indication as to the difference between the TRA needed to 
impose a TPIM and to impose an ETPIM arises from Condition D,
59
 which provides that the 
Secretary of State must ‘reasonably consider that some or all of the measures to be imposed’ 
are not measures that can be imposed by a TPIM.  
 
The requirement under Condition B in both instruments that some or all of the TRA must be 
‘new’60 gives the impression at first glance that the involvement of a person in TRA is being 
monitored, and if there is no new TRA, then these measures cannot be deployed, taking 
account of possible deradicalisation or disengagement from certain associates. The apparent 
emphasis on ‘new’ TRA appears to be designed to avoid giving the impression that persons 
who have been placed on control orders for some years might merely then be ‘parked’ on the 
new measures without scrutiny of their current activities. In fact, the position is far less 
transparent than that, as discussed below. It can be concluded that the appearance of rectitude 
created by setting out this range of Conditions in both instruments is to an extent belied by 
the reality.  
 
Time periods under TPIMs, ETPIMs or both combined 
 
A TPIM notice can only be imposed for a two-year maximum period,
61
 although a fresh 
TPIM can then be imposed if a reasonable belief can be shown that ‘new’ terrorism-related 
                                                 
58
 Clause 2(1) ETPIM Bill. If the presence of the TRA is established on the balance of probabilities, it appears 
that either a TPIMs or ETPIM notice could be imposed, but not both at the same time (ETPIM Bill clause 4(1)). 
Since s26 TPIMA provides for the use of temporary ETPIMs (see n 2 above) the same threshold is used. It may 
be noted that reliance in the Bill on a number of provisions of TPIMA, includes the definition of Terrorism-
related activity (TRA) in TPIMA s4(1). 
59
 Clause 2(4). 
60
 Condition B in both: TPIMA s 3(2), ETPIMA cl 2(2). ‘New’ is defined in TPIMA, s 3(6)  and ETPIM Bill, cl 
2(6). 
61
 It can be imposed for one year initially; it may only be imposed for a further year if Conditions A,C,D are 
met: so it is not necessary for suspicion of new TRA to be present – s 5(1),(2),(3). Where a TPIM has expired it 
can be ‘revived’ (s 13(6)) without an application to a Court if it has not been revoked, or extended under s 5 (s 
13(6)), and can be revived regardless of revocation or extension if an application to court has been made  (s 
12 
 
activity has occurred after the imposition of the first notice,
62
 or, if two or more TPIM notices 
have been in force, the ‘new’ TRA must have occurred after the coming into force of the 
most recent notice.
63
 These time periods under TPIMA differentiate the scheme significantly 
from the control orders one since the orders could be renewed indefinitely. However, the term 
‘new’ (in Condition B) is otiose under TPIMA if no TPIM notice has ever been in force 
against the individual since the TRA can have occurred ‘at any time’ before or after the 
coming into force of TPIMA,
64
 and it is not a requirement that if a person has been subjected 
to a control order previously, the new TRA should have occurred since the order was 
imposed.
65
 That position obviously made it easy to transfer all the controlees to TPIMs in 
January 2012. As Collins J. observed in Secretary of State for the Home Department v BM,
66
 
‘new’ is therefore a somewhat ‘odd adjective’ to use.67 However, he pointed out that the age 
of the terrorism-related activity is relevant in considering whether Condition C is satisfied 
since an order will not be necessary unless there is a need to protect the public from a risk of 
terrorism.
68
 In other words, if there has been a very significant time lapse between the point at 
which the TPIM is being considered and the suspected TRA, Condition C might not be 
satisfied since the current need to protect the public might not appear to be established. 
 
The position under the ETIM Bill in respect of the need for ‘new’ TRA is very similar except, 
significantly, in relation to suspects who have been subjected to a TPIM previously. Again, 
the term ‘new’ should not be taken at face value, but as creating in effect three categories of 
suspect.
69
 First there is the category covering those who have never been placed under an 
                                                                                                                                                        
13(7)); it can be revived regardless of it being extended under s 5: s 13(7), s 6(1)(b). Also a TPIM notice may be 
revoked (s 13(2)) and later renewed when a TPIM subject is taken into custody when he/she has been charged 
with a criminal offence, meaning that the clock can be stopped: the two-year period could thus be somewhat 
lengthened, even if the charge is then dropped. 
62
 TPIMA, ss 3(2), (6)(b). 
63
 TIPMA, ss 3(2), (6)(c). 
64
 TPIMA, s 3(6)(a). 
65
 This follows from s 3(6)(a) and para 4 of Sched 8 which provides that the Secretary of State’s powers under 
the 2011 Act ‘are not affected by a control order having been made in relation to that individual’; provided the 
conditions set out in s3 are satisfied, the Secretary of State is entitled to impose measures by a TPIM notice on 
an individual in respect of activities which wholly or in part founded the making of the control order. See 
Secretary of State for the Home Department v AM [2012] EWHC 1854 (Admin) per Mitting J. [13]; Secretary of 
State for the Home Department v CC and CF  [2012] WLR(D) 283, [21].  
66
 [2012] 1 WLR 2734. 
67
 ibid at [16]. 
68
 ibid at [15]. 
69
 The position differs under TPIMA, s 27 which applies to temporary ETPIMs under s 26: ‘s 27(1) A 
temporary enhanced TPIM order, except for designated transitional and saving provision, ceases to have 
effect— 
(a) at the end of the period of 90 days beginning with the day on which the Secretary of State makes the order, 
or 
13 
 
ETPIM. The position is the same as under TPIMA: the TRA could have occurred at any 
time.
70
 Again, the need to show ‘new’ terrorism-related activity is in fact merely a need to 
show TRA: the term ‘new’ does not impose an extra condition and so is misleading. That is 
of particular significance since it means that a suspect could already have been subject to a 
TPIM, and the intention is to transfer him or her to an ETPIM. He or she can be so 
transferred without showing ‘new’ TRA, meaning that the two year period during which a 
TPIM can subsist can in effect be extended to four years via an ETPIM, if the ETPIM Bill 
becomes law,
71 
so long as the previous TRA relied on could satisfy the ‘reasonable belief’ 
requirement.
72
 It would also need to be apparent – to an unspecified standard of proof – that 
the TPIM restrictions were not sufficient to deal with the risk the suspect created.
73
 Thus, a 
person could have been subjected to a control order, followed by a TPIM, and then by an 
ETPIM without having re-engaged in new TRA. However, the point made in BM as to 
Condition C would also apply to ETPIMs: the fact that the TRA is four years or more old, 
could be taken to mean, especially in relation to less high risk suspects, that the imposition of 
the ETPIM is not necessary to protect the public from a risk of terrorism.
74
 
 
Secondly, suspects can be transferred from an ETPIM to a new ETPIM after two years. In 
that category it is necessary to show that ‘new’ terrorism related activity occurred after the 
first notice came into force to impose the new notice.
75
 Significantly, clause 11(3) of the 
ETPIM Bill indicates that after an ETPIM has been imposed, the requirement of ‘new’ TRA 
allows for previous TRA also to be taken into account in deciding to impose a further 
                                                                                                                                                        
(b) at such earlier time (if any) as is specified in the order’. 
70
 Clause 2(6)(c). 
71
 Note that if the Act is repealed, then any enhanced TPIM notices may remain in force for a transitional period 
of 28 days only, after which they cease to have effect: ETPIM Bill, cl 10. 
72
 This was addressed in the ETPIM Bill ECHR memo, n 29, para 11:  
The power to impose an enhanced TPIM notice is not affected by the individual having been subject to 
a standard TPIM notice or vice versa (clause 4). An enhanced TPIM notice may therefore be imposed 
on an individual who, when the Bill comes into force, is subject to a standard TPIM notice. A person 
cannot be bound by a standard TPIM notice while the ETPIM notice is in force (clause 4(1) ETPIM 
Bill). In such a case, the standard TPIM notice must be revoked before an enhanced notice may be 
imposed.  
73
 Clause 2(4)(b). The clause only requires that the Home Secretary ‘reasonably considers it necessary’ to 
employ the more onerous restrictions. 
74
 ETPIM Bill, cl 2(3) Condition C. 
75
 Clause 2(6)(b). The government made it clear in its response to the Select Committee on ETPIMs that that 
possibility would be available: ‘If the individual re-engages in terrorism-related activity, it is open to the Home 
Secretary to consider whether to impose a fresh TPIM or, in exceptional circumstances, an ETPIM notice. It 
would also be possible to consider imposing a TPIM notice on an individual following the end of an ETPIM 
notice...’: n 28, 6 para 2.   
14 
 
measure on the controlled person.
76
 If two or more ETPIM notices have been in force the 
‘new’ TRA must have occurred after the coming into force of the most recent notice.77 The 
third category covers suspects being transferred from an ETPIM to a new TPIM Under 
section 3(6) of the TPIMA no provision is made requiring new TRA if the suspect had not 
previously been subject to a TPIM. However, it would appear that the term ‘TPIM’ in section 
3(6)(b) arguably should be interpreted to include the term ‘ETPIM’, meaning that new TRA 
would be needed.    
 
David Anderson QC, the current government appointed Independent Reviewer of Terrorism 
Legislation, has found that the two-year limit for TPIMs could have positive results, ‘in terms 
of concentrating minds on the need for serious efforts to prosecute, deport or de-radicalise 
controlled persons’.78 However, that is clearly less likely to be the case in relation to ETPIMs, 
given that the need for ‘new’ TRA fails to provide an inhibiting effect on imposing an 
ETPIM after a TPIM. But even if ETPIMs are introduced, and certain suspects are subjected 
to them after being subjected to a TPIM, some new TRA would be needed after two years to 
subject them to a further measure,
79
 a clear improvement on the position under control orders.   
 
TPIM or ETPIM restrictions affecting association, communication, 
movement, property 
 
The obligations that can be imposed under TPIMs are less onerous than those that could be 
imposed under control orders, or under ETPIMs, in a range of respects. Greater access to 
electronic communications is allowed since a minimum level of access is specified,
80
 relevant 
to the investigative element of the TPIM scheme, discussed below. Under an ETPIM notice 
greater restrictions on telephone and internet access can be specified without such a minimum 
                                                 
76
 Clause 11(3): ‘In a case where: (a) an enhanced TPIM notice has come into force in relation to an individual, 
and (b) by virtue of the coming into force of that enhanced TPIM notice, terrorism-related activity which 
occurred before the coming into force of that notice has ceased to be new terrorism-related activity (within the 
meaning of s2(6)) in relation to that individual for the purposes of that section, the Secretary of State is not 
prevented from taking account of that activity for the purposes of the continued imposition, or subsequent 
imposition, of measures on that individual’. 
77
 Clauses 2(2), 2(6)(c). 
78
 ‘Control Orders in 2011,’ n 35 above, para 6.34.  
79
 Taking account of the provision in clause 11(3). 
80
 The 2011 Act provides in Sched 1 para 7(1): ‘The Secretary of State must allow the individual to possess and 
use (at least) one of each of the following descriptions of device (subject to any conditions on such use as may 
be specified under sub-para (2)(b)) – 3(a) a telephone operated by connection to a fixed line; 3(b) a computer 
that provides access to the internet by connection to a fixed line (including any apparatus necessary for that 
purpose); 3(c) a mobile telephone that does not provide access to the internet’. 
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level so that a total ban on access to such devices can be imposed.
81
 The option to prevent 
travel abroad is retained under TPIMA
82
 and under the ETPIM Bill,
83
 as is the option to 
require daily reporting to the police.
84
 The option to prevent transfer of funds abroad under 
the PTA is replaced by an option under TPIMA to place restrictions on transfers of property 
and requirements to disclose details of property;
85
 the same provisions are available under the 
ETPIM Bill.
86
  
 
The association measures are much more restrictive under the ETPIM Bill: a suspect under a 
standard TPIM notice can be required to seek prior permission from the Secretary of State 
before meeting or communicating with ‘specified persons or specified descriptions of 
persons,’87 whereas under the ‘enhanced’ form of such a measure, a suspect can be required 
to seek permission before meeting or communicating with literally anyone – ‘other 
persons’,88 but provision is made to allow the individual, without seeking permission, to 
communicate with persons specified by the Secretary of State.
89
 Thus, under a TPIM notice a 
suspect can be barred from any communication or association with specific people, whereas 
under its enhanced form, he/she can be barred from communication or association with 
anyone at all, apart from specific permitted persons. In contrast, the work or studies measures 
and the monitoring measures that can be specified under a TPIM notice or under its enhanced 
form are identical. Under both the Secretary of State can impose a requirement not to carry 
out specified work or studies,
90
 and the individual can be required to cooperate with measures 
allowing communications, movement (via electronic tagging) or other activities to be 
monitored.
91
 These restrictions, including limitations on electronic means of communication, 
affect the qualified ECHR rights in Articles 8-11 but they have tended to be upheld by the 
courts as necessary and proportionate interferences with those rights.
92
 However, some of 
                                                 
81
 Sched 1 cl 8.  
82
 Without permission of the Secretary of State (TPIMA, Sched 1 para 2).  
83
 Sched 1 clause 2. 
84
TPIMA, Sched 1 para 10; ETPIM Bill, Sched 1 cl 11.  
85
 TPIMA, Sched 1 para 6. 
86
 Sched 1 clause 7. 
87
 TPIMA, Sched 1 para 8(2)(a). 
88
 Sched 1 clause 9; the employment of a total ban on association and communication appears in clause 9(2)(a). 
See also TPIMA, s 26(3)(d)(ii) which makes the same provision in relation to temporary ETPIMs. 
89
 Sched 1 clause 9(3).  
90
 TPIMA Sched 1 para 9; ETPIM Bill Sched 1 para 10. 
91
 TPIMA, Sched 1 para 12; ETPIM Bill, Sched 1 cl 13. 
92
 For example in AM v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2011] EWHC 2486 (Admin) the High 
Court upheld control order conditions that included bans on any internet access at the individual’s home and on 
the use of USB memory sticks to transfer any data from his home to his university, restrictions on his access to 
the internet at university and when visiting his parents. 
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them could also be taken into account under a holistic evaluation of the deprivation of liberty 
concept under Article 5(1),
93
 to which this comment now turns. 
 
The ‘deprivation of liberty’ jurisprudence underlying design of obligations 
imposed under control orders, TPIMs or ETPIMs  
 
Introduction 
 
Under the PTA any obligations that the Secretary of State considered necessary for the purpose 
of preventing or restricting involvement in terrorism-related activity could be imposed,
94
 with 
the implied requirement that they did not breach Article 5 ECHR.
95
 Under TPIMA and under the 
ETPIM Bill, however, the obligations are specified in Schedule 1 in both instruments. Under 
TPIMA the obligations are also more limited; they are clearly designed to ensure that Article 5 is 
very unlikely to be breached, taking account of the control orders case-law. In contrast, ETPIMs 
under Schedule 1, Part 1 of the ETPIMs Bill, can impose measures very similar to those that 
could be imposed under ‘heavy touch’ control orders. 
 
TPIMs and ETPIMs have been presented to Parliament as avoiding the creation of 
deprivations of liberty for the purposes of Article 5(1) ECHR, basing this contention on the 
control orders case-law.
96
 The problem, which this article turns to below, is that in so far as 
that case-law and executive responses to it can be said to represent a dialogue between the 
domestic courts, the executive and Parliament
97
 it has arguably had a ‘negative suppressive’ 
                                                 
93
 See Secretary of State for the Home Department v AP [2011] 3 WLR 51; the Supreme Court found that the 
fact that a restriction affects a qualified right, in that case Article 8, does not preclude it from being viewed as 
also relevant to analysis under Article 5(1). In Guzzardi [1980] 3 EHRR 333, relied on in AP, lack of social 
contacts was taken into account in finding a deprivation of liberty ([50]). This could now include eg limitations 
on use of the internet, preventing access to social media. 
94
 The obligations listed in the PTA were, formally speaking, only illustrative, although in practice they were 
relied on. 
95
 The PTA operated subject to an implied – but unclear – restriction to the effect that the obligations imposed 
must not breach Article 5 ECHR. That was the apparent position, since otherwise, obviously, the orders could 
not be viewed as ones that did not require a derogation from that Article. Certain orders were quashed on the 
basis that they were in fact derogating orders which the Home Secretary had had no power to make – see 
Secretary of State for the Home Department v JJ [2007] 3 WLR 642. 
96
 This is necessary since the interferences with liberty they create would not fall within the narrow exceptions 
to Article 5, and in each instance the decision was taken by the government in question not to seek a derogation 
from that Article. See ‘TPIMA ECHR memo’, n 28, para 23 ‘ETPIM Bill ECHR Memo’ n 29, para 24 and the 
ETPIM Bill Joint Committee n 3, para 98. 
97
 See the annual PTA renewal debates from 2006 to 2011: see eg UK, HC Deb vol 506, col 725, 1 March 2010 
(David Heath).  See also responses to oversight bodies, including the JCHR: for example, ‘Counter-Terrorism 
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quality in relation to the ETPIM Bill, meaning that it appears to have provided ratification for 
the view that the Bill is Article 5-compliant, stifling parliamentary concerns,
98
 and obscuring 
the departure from the Strasbourg jurisprudence that appears to be underway. The discussion 
below centres on the sense in which ETPIMs have the potential to create a deprivation of liberty. 
 
The concept of ‘deprivation of liberty’ under Article 5(1) at Strasbourg 
 
The autonomous Strasbourg concept of deprivation of liberty under Article 5(1)
99
 creates a 
deliberate disconnect between the commonly understood idea of taking liberty away, and the 
idea of an intensified ‘deprivation’ of it which requires justification within the specified and 
narrow exceptions under Article 5. That disconnect opens up an imprecise area for state 
action interfering with liberty which measures of the type of control orders, TPIMs or 
ETPIMs can inhabit, although Article 5 itself contains no exception allowing for forms of 
executive detention to protect national security. Article 5 was designed at a time when only 
paradigmatic deprivations of liberty – arrest, detention – were in contemplation by the 
drafters of the ECHR.
100
 Since then a range of non-paradigm interventions have arisen, based 
on the control order model. Such measures may fall just short of the point at which the 
concept of such deprivation converges with that of an interference with movement under 
Protocol 4 Article 2,
101
 which the UK has not ratified. No control order case has yet been 
decided at Strasbourg, but the leading Strasbourg decision in Guzzardi v Italy
102
 potentially 
enables Article 5 to encompass such measures since it focuses on the impact of restrictions on 
the life the person subject to them would otherwise have been living.
103
 In Guzzardi it was 
found in relation to non-paradigmatic interferences with liberty that the difference between a 
deprivation of and a restriction on liberty was one of degree, not of substance, and that it was 
for the court to assess into which category a particular case fell, taking account of a range of 
criteria, including the ‘type, duration, effects and manner of implementation of the measure in 
                                                                                                                                                        
Policy and Human Rights (Sixteenth Report): Annual Renewal of Control Orders Legislation’ 2010 HL 64, HC 
395 (2010). 
98
 See the ETPIM Bill Joint Committee n 3, para 88. 
99
 Article 5(1) provides: ‘Everyone has the right to liberty and security of person. No one shall be deprived of 
his liberty save in the following cases and in accordance with a procedure prescribed by law.’ 
100
 See: P. van Dijk & G. van Hoof, Theory and Practice of the European Court of Human Rights 2
nd
 ed 
(Dordrecht, Netherlands: Kluwer Law International, 1990) 255; J. Murdoch, ‘Safeguarding the Liberty of the 
Person: Recent Strasbourg Jurisprudence’ (1993) 42 ICLQ 494, 497-499.  
101
 See E. Bates, ‘Anti-terrorism Control Orders: Liberty and Security Still in the Balance’ (2009) 29 LS 99. 
102
 [1980] 3 EHRR 333.  
103
 ibid at [95]. 
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question’.104 The curfew of nine hours daily that had been imposed was not the core issue in 
the finding that the restrictions amounted to a deprivation of liberty.
105
 Ashingdane v UK
106
 
re-emphasised the point made in Guzzardi that the core obligation of confinement should not 
be given overwhelming weight,
107
 as did Storck v Germany.
108
 Strasbourg has also found in a 
number of cases on supervisory house arrest that daily periods of about 12 hours curfew or 
house detention may fall outside the deprivation of liberty concept (Trijonis,
109
 Ciancimo,
110
 
Raimondo).
111
 Below, the Strasbourg understanding of that concept, especially as stated in 
Guzzardi, is contrasted with that adopted in the control orders jurisprudence. 
 
Domestic Article 5 jurisprudence on non-derogating control orders 
 
When non-derogating control orders were introduced they included (initially) 18 hours daily 
house detention/arrest (curfew) and forced relocation.
112
 As the decisions briefly discussed 
below indicate, their use therefore relied in effect on a derogation from Article 5 by stealth, or 
                                                 
104
 ibid at [92]. Guzzardi was confined on a small island for 16 months within a confined area and subject to 
house detention for 9 hours overnight daily. That meant that he had to remain in his home (where his family was 
allowed to reside but which was dilapidated) between 10 pm-7 am; he also had to seek permission to make 
phone calls or have visitors. He was ordered (although there was no physical restraint such as a fence) to remain 
in an area of 2.5 square kilometres. The Court noted that there were few opportunities for social contacts. 
105
 The Court found: ‘the treatment complained of resembles detention in an ‘open prison…or committal to a 
disciplinary unit’. Ibid [95]. 
106
 (1985) 7 EHRR 528. 
107
 Ibid [41]-[42]; here confinements (a) in a closed psychiatric hospital with high security (which included 
barred windows, a high perimeter fence; visits to family twice in 7 years) and (b) in an open hospital with only 
an overnight residence requirement on three days a week were both found to create a deprivation of liberty. In 
the open hospital he had regular, unescorted leave to visit his family, going home every weekend from Thursday 
till Sunday and he was free to leave the hospital Monday-Wednesday, during the day. He argued that the 
restrictions to which he was subject at the open hospital were such as to constitute restrictions on his freedom of 
movement only and not a deprivation of liberty. The Court found that the applicant had remained a detained 
patient during his stay in the open hospital in the sense that his liberty, and not just his freedom of movement, 
was circumscribed both in fact and in law. 
108
 (2006) 43 EHRR 96 at [74]; the Court found: ‘the notion of deprivation of liberty within the meaning of 
Article 5(1) does not only comprise the objective element of a person's confinement in a particular restricted 
space for a not negligible length of time’. The Court went on: ‘..the starting-point must be the specific situation 
of the individual concerned and account must be taken of a whole range of factors arising in a particular case, 
such as the type, duration, effects and manner of implementation of the measure in question’ (2006) 43 EHRR 
96 at [71], [74]. The Court added: ‘A person can only be considered to have been deprived of his liberty if, as an 
additional subjective element, he has not validly consented to the confinement in question’. The Court relied on 
Guzzardi v Italy, [92] and on a range of cases in which various aspects of ‘deprivation of liberty’ were in doubt, 
including the question whether confinement in a large area could fall within the term ‘deprivation’: Nielsen v 
Denmark (1989) 11 EHRR 175 at [67]; HM v Switzerland (2002) 38 EHRR 314 at [42], [46]. 
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 Trijonis v Lithuania (App No. 2333/02), 17 March 2005.  
110
 Ciancimino v Italy (1991) 70 DR 103. 
111
 Raimondo v Italy (1994) 18 EHRR 237 [39]. 
112
 They also included random house searches, geographical restrictions, electronic tagging, bans on visits by 
non-approved persons, and prohibitions on electronic communication. Under s1(3) of the 2005 Act there was no 
limitation on the measures that could be imposed under non-derogating control orders, except that the Home 
Secretary could only impose those deemed necessary to prevent TRA. See further Walker n 14. 
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on an implicit executive presupposition as to the need for acceptance of an attenuated or 
recalibrated version of Article 5.
113
 The precise limits imposed by Article 5(1) at Strasbourg, 
as discussed above, undeniably left some leeway, not only to put forward the scheme as a 
whole as compatible with the Article, but also to allow for argument that the obligations 
imposed under individual early control orders did not overall fall within Article 5(1). But a 
deprivation of liberty was found by the House of Lords in JJ
114
 due inter alia to the 
imposition of house detention for 18 hours daily and restriction of movement to specified 
areas.
115
 The majority accepted that the difference between deprivation of and restriction on 
liberty was one of degree, not of substance. The court’s task was to take account of a range of 
criteria from Guzzardi v Italy
116
 to assess the impact of the restrictions on the controlees in 
the context of the life they might otherwise have been living. Secretary of State for the Home 
Department v E
117
 followed JJ, but Lord Bingham focussed more strongly on the issue of 
restraint on physical liberty, finding that the restrictions cumulatively could not ‘effect a 
deprivation of liberty if the core element of confinement, to which other restrictions....are 
ancillary, is insufficiently stringent.’118 Secretary of State for the Home Department v MB 
and AF
119
 gave some support to the finding of Lord Brown in JJ that sixteen hours daily 
house detention appeared to be the upper limit.
120
 These three decisions were interpreted by 
the then Labour government in various public statements to mean that the Lords had given 
support to the control orders scheme,
121
 due to the apparent acceptability of 16 hours house 
detention, combined with other restrictions, within Article 5.  
 
However, AP v Secretary of State for the Home Department
122
 relied on Guzzardi in finding 
that the imposition of fourteen hours daily house detention combined with forced relocation 
had created a deprivation of liberty since due to the suspect’s particular family circumstances 
                                                 
113
 See Fenwick n 15 above.  
114
 Secretary of State for the Home Department v JJ [2007] 3 WLR 642. 
115
 Restrictions also included spot searches of residences and electronic tagging. 
116
 [1980] 3 EHRR 333.  
117
 [2007] 3 WLR 720. 
118
 ibid at [11]. 
119
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120
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hour curfews were consistent with physical liberty. But see also Lord Brown in Secretary of State for the Home 
Department v AP [2011] 53 WLR 53 at [3] in which he emphasised that this was not the majority view in JJ, 
and that curfew length was only one factor among many.  
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 See: Counter Terrorism Policy and Human Rights (ninth report) Annual Renewal of Control Orders 
Legislation 2008 Home Office, Report Cm 7368 (2008) 4. 
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 [2011] 3 WLR 51. 
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he had suffered an unusually high degree of social isolation.
123
 Although this decision took a 
more holistic view of the deprivation of liberty concept, the Supreme Court may be said to 
have given its imprimatur to the use of executive measures of this type since the decision 
indicated that fourteen-hour to sixteen-hour periods of home detention, repeated over a long 
period of time, would not create a deprivation of liberty, even combined with forced 
relocation, unless the particular circumstances of the suspect relocation or other conditions 
satisfied the ‘unusually destructive of normal life’ test. When the findings in AP on forced 
relocation were applied in subsequent cases, it was found that specific relocations would not 
infringe Article 5, barring special circumstances,
124
 and that under Article 8 the relocation 
obligation would usually be found to be a necessary and proportionate measure to protect the 
public.
125
 Where particular social isolation might arise, it has been found that it could be 
alleviated by requiring the Secretary of State to contribute to the travel costs incurred by the 
controlee’s family in visiting him.126 
 
Directly liberty-invading restrictions under TPIMA and the ETPIM Bill 
 
It is clear that in the decisions discussed the domestic courts brought the application of the 
control orders scheme into somewhat closer compliance with Article 5, without rejecting the 
scheme as a whole,
127
 thus in effect paving the way for the introduction of both TPIMs and 
ETPIMs, and influencing the legal design of the new measures.
128
 The obligations available 
under both instruments, while designed to interfere with the liberty of suspects in such a way 
as to prevent them from engaging in forms of terrorism-related activity, nevertheless had to 
avoid creating, in legal terms, a ‘deprivation of liberty’ under Article 5(1). But a political 
decision was taken, not fully necessitated by the control orders’ jurisprudence, to rely on a 
                                                 
123
 ibid at [4]. Lord Brown found that a control order with a 16-hour curfew and a fortiori one of 14 hours, 
would not be struck down as involving a deprivation of liberty, unless the other conditions imposed were 
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 ibid. The court dismissed an appeal brought by CD against the Secretary of State’s decision to refuse to 
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 See generally as regards control orders K. Ewing & J. Tham, ‘The Continuing Futility of the Human Rights 
Act’ [2008] PL 668. 
128
 See ECHR memoranda for both instruments: TPIM, n 28, paras 16-2, 24-42, and ETPIM, n 29, paras 19-24.  
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less liberty-invading scheme for TPIMA
129
 which did not explore the limits of Article 5 
tolerance, but fell well within them, as part of a much-trumpeted movement after the General 
Election 2010 towards the restoration of liberties.
130
 In pursuit of that determination the more 
lengthy house detention requirements under control orders were relaxed, becoming only an 
‘overnight residence requirement’, and the relocation provisions were dropped.131 Thus, it is 
not the case that TPIMA was mainly the result of a ‘suppressive dialogue’ influencing 
parliamentary and judicial acceptance of a variant of the control orders model. Rather, it was 
the result of a serious engagement with human rights arguments by the executive and 
Parliament which transcended the judicial engagement with them under the Human Rights 
Act (HRA).  
 
The ‘overnight’ requirement under TPIMA is ‘a requirement, applicable overnight between 
such hours as are specified, to remain at, or within, the specified residence.’132 Clearly, the 
requirement leaves open room for interpretation of the term ‘overnight’. It has been viewed 
by the Secretary of State in imposing the early TPIM notices as a requirement for the 
controlled person to remain at his/her residence between the hours of 9.00 pm and 7.00 am 
daily. In Secretary of State for the Home Department v BM
133
 Collins J found that ‘overnight’ 
in common parlance should be taken to bear some relationship to the hours between which 
most people would regard it as reasonable to assume that people might be at home, the 
evening having come to an end. He considered that the hours that could be specified would 
not extend beyond the period 9.00pm to 7.00am.
134
 In Secretary of State for the Home 
Department v CC, CF
135
 a challenge to an overnight measure covering those hours as beyond 
the powers accorded by TPIMA Schedule 1 was rejected, applying that test.
136
 Thus at 
present a TPIM notice can specify a 10 hour curfew, between those hours, which is well 
                                                 
129
 Anderson indicated in his review of TPIMS that it was a political decision ‘TPIMs in 2012,’ n 34 above, 37. 
130
 For example, in July 2010 Theresa May suggested that the counterterrorism review that led to the Protection 
of Freedom Bill would "…restore the ancient civil liberties that should be synonymous with the name of our 
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 Sched 1 para 1(2)(c), TPIMA.   
133
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134
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 ibid at [65]. 
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within the limits placed on house detention in the domestic control order cases and within the 
time limits accepted at Strasbourg, as discussed. Control orders could impose general 
geographical boundaries, whereas imposition of such boundaries are not available under 
TPIMA; instead there is a power to exclude the controlled person from particular specified 
places, such as streets and specified areas or descriptions of places, such as tube stations or 
airports.
137
   
 
In contrast to their influence on the legal design of TPIMs, those four leading control order 
decisions were centrally determinative in relation to ETPIMs, which were designed to remain 
just within the outer limits of the Article 5 tolerance that they delineated. The acceptance that 
ETPIM notices can impose relocation
138
 and lengthy periods of house detention,
139
 well 
beyond the overnight residence requirements of TPIMs, clearly relies on those decisions. 
That was made explicit in the explanatory notes accompanying the ETPIM Bill and in the 
ECHR memo, relying on JJ and AP.
140
 Forced relocation had attracted particularly severe 
criticism, being dubbed a form of internal exile by the JCHR,
141
 but, as discussed, the 
domestic courts accepted that the principle of forced relocation can be compatible with 
Article 5, and post-AP courts have upheld the Secretary of State’s decision on relocation.142 
Again, the combinations of restrictions, and in particular the question when to combine house 
detention with forced relocation, are a matter of executive discretion. In Schedule 1 the Bill 
sets limits to a number of the obligations, although they are broader than those under TPIMA, 
but in the case of house detention it does not, leaving the length of the detention to executive 
discretion.
143
 Thus, the wide executive discretion created by the PTA, which led to findings 
that the package of measures imposed by individual control orders breached Article 5, is 
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 TPIMA, Sched 1 para 3. 
138
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‘extraordinary’: see n 29 above, para 41. 
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 See Secretary of State for the Home Department v BM [2011] EWHC 1969 (Admin); Secretary of State v BX 
[2010] EWHC 990 (Admin); and CD v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2011] EWHC 1273 
(Admin). 
143
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specified’. Under an ETPIM notice the residence measure in Sched 1 para 1 can require the suspect to observe a 
curfew which can fall at any time during the day, in contrast to TPIMA’s overnight requirement so, relying on 
the implied restriction stemming from the domestic Article 5 jurisprudence, an ETPIM notice can allow for a 
curfew of up to sixteen hours which can be combined with forced relocation. 
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largely replicated in the ETPIM Bill.
144 
In a further contrast to TPIMA, the ETPIM Bill 
includes a ‘movement restrictions measure’ allowing restrictions to be imposed on an 
individual preventing him or her leaving a particular place, thus re-imposing general 
geographical boundaries.
145
  
 
Are TPIM or ETPIM notices likely to create a deprivation of liberty?  
 
David Anderson QC considers that the ETPIMs and TPIMs schemes are ECHR-
compatible,
146
 and Parliament has been informed that both achieve compatibility.
147
 Clearly, 
the possibility of finding a breach of Article 5 is most likely to occur in relation to ETPIM 
notices, given the ETPIM Bill’s exploration of the outer limits of the domestic deprivation of 
liberty concept.
148
 The Home Office memo on the ECHR in relation to ETPIMs relied on the 
control orders’ case-law which strongly emphasised the period of interference with physical 
liberty – actual confinement149 – a position which had been reaffirmed in AP, and assumed 
that the other restraints were ancillary to that confinement. But that position does not comport 
very obviously with the holistic Guzzardi approach. Further, the memo on the ETPIM Bill 
assumes quite readily that between fourteen-sixteen hours house detention daily a grey area is 
apparent within which the imposition of other unusually stringent obligations might tip the 
balance into a deprivation of liberty.
150
 But as discussed Strasbourg has found that daily 
periods of about 12 hours, but not necessarily 14 hours or more, house detention may fall 
outside Article 5(1).
151
 So the Strasbourg jurisprudence is being to an extent disregarded in 
relation to ETPIMs.  
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 Lord Plant has pointed out that while the schemes may be compatible, the question is whether individual 
combination of measures imposed on suspects do not create a deprivation of liberty, which may not be the case: 
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The question of the duration of the interference with liberty and therefore of the cumulative 
effect of measures imposed over a long period of time is one of the key indicators of a 
deprivation of liberty at Strasbourg. This question might arise in relation to TPIM notices, 
since, as indicated above, those subject to them were previously subject to control orders,
152
 
and this matter is likely to be especially pertinent if a suspect who has been subject to a TPIM 
is then subjected to an ETPIM. Duration was one of the four factors expressly identified in 
Guzzardi as relevant to determining whether a deprivation of liberty had arisen, but in the 
domestic control order decisions it has received little emphasis. In 2013 it appears that two 
controlled individuals have been subjected to orders for almost eight years and a further five 
have been subjected to them for more than six years (including in all cases well over one year 
on a TPIM notice).
153
 Those are obviously very significant periods of time. If some of this 
group of suspects is then subjected to an ETPIM notice, and the ETPIM notices are 
challenged, it could be expected that the issue of duration in relation to Article 5 would be 
pivotal. However the fact that TPIMs or ETPIMs, unlike control orders, do not subsist for an 
indefinite period, and so an endpoint would be in sight, would obviously be relevant.  
 
Like control orders, the obligations imposed under TPIMs and ETPIMs are backed up by 
criminal sanctions. If a controlled person infringes any of the obligations imposed by, for 
example, leaving the residence during the controlled hours, he or she is liable to arrest and 
criminal charges.
154
 The matter of coercion was emphasised in Gillan v UK
155
 in the context 
of suspicion-less stop and search under section 44 of the Terrorism Act 2000. The Lords had 
found domestically that those stopped had merely been detained in the sense of being ‘kept 
from proceeding or kept waiting’,156 and so the interference with their liberty fell outside the 
ambit of Article 5(1). But the Strasbourg Court refused to be seduced, impliedly or expressly, 
by executive arguments as to the need to maintain a narrow ambit of Article 5(1) in the 
counter-terrorism context,
157
 and contemplated a higher standard as to the liberty of the 
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subject than the House of Lords had done,
158
  finding that the use of coercion would be 
relevant to the question whether a deprivation of liberty had occurred.
159
 The element of 
coercion underpinning the TPIM and ETPIM obligations is therefore one of the strongest 
indicators that they could cause a deprivation of liberty, following Gillan. It might also be 
relevant that the coercion has subsisted in respect of all the current persons subjected to these 
obligations for the periods of time indicated, since all of them were previously subject to 
control orders. A number of the persons currently subject to TPIM notices have already spent 
periods of time in prison for breach of the obligations imposed under the control orders that 
they were previously subjected to.
160
  
 
Relevance of the purpose of an ETPIM? 
 
If ETPIMs are introduced and considered in relation to Article 5(1) in future, the argument 
pressed upon courts in relation to control orders, but overtly rejected, that the purpose of an 
ETPIM should be capable of taking it outside the ambit of Article 5(1),
161
 might re-emerge. A 
similar argument for relying on proportionality-based arguments to narrow the ambit of 
Article 5(1) has gained some purchase at Strasbourg. The House of Lords found in Austin v 
The Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis,
162
 that ‘kettling’ protesters and bystanders for 
seven hours did not create a deprivation of liberty
163
 since in making a determination as to the 
ambit of Article 5(1), the purpose of the interference with liberty could be viewed as relevant, 
allowing a balance to be struck between what the restriction sought to achieve and the 
interests of the individual.
164
 The Grand Chamber then echoed that finding in Austin v UK,
165
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movement was restricted by them’ if the measures were proportionate to the aim pursued. 
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determining that, relying on the context of the imposition of the ‘kettle’,166 the purpose of its 
imposition must be taken into account.
167
 Although the Court did not refer expressly to 
proportionality, it clearly adverted to that concept
168
 in finding that the measure taken 
appeared to be the ‘least intrusive and most effective means to be applied’,169 and on that 
basis no deprivation of liberty was found. A strong joint dissenting opinion trenchantly 
criticised the findings of the majority as creating a new and objectionable proposition,
170
 
since if liberty-depriving measures were deemed to lie outside Article 5(1) if claimed to be 
necessary for any legitimate/public-interest purpose, states could circumvent Article 5 for 
various reasons going beyond the exceptions.
171
 The findings contradicted those in A v UK
172
 
in which the Grand Chamber refused to accept that in the counter-terror context the purpose 
of a measure – detention without trial under the ACTSA – could be relied on to create a new 
exception to Article 5. Austin in effect creates a new, very broad, exception to Article 5,
173
 
while purporting to avoid relating the public interest argument to the issue of ambit.   
 
Clearly, the crowd control situation in Austin differed from those at stake in relation to 
TPIMs/ETPIMs, but it could arguably be a small step from Austin to a finding that if a 
measure interfering with liberty appears to be necessary due to the demands of the terrorist 
threat, such a measure will not be found to create a deprivation of liberty, if the least intrusive 
means needed to answer to the threat (such as a ‘lighter touch’ ETPIM) is adopted. Thus, 
Austin creates some leeway to allow this purposive principle to make its way into the 
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counter-terror context in respect of non-paradigm interferences with liberty via ETPIMs 
which already tend to skirt or cross the boundaries of Article 5(1) tolerance,
174
 bearing in 
mind that Strasbourg has not so far found that 16 hours daily house detention, combined with 
restrictions such as relocation, necessarily falls within Article 5(1). If the Austin argument, 
creating in effect a limitation of Article 5(1)’s ambit where alternative measures were 
unavailable (on the basis that prosecution had been ruled out on national security grounds), 
were to gain purchase in this context, the question would be whether a particular ETPIM 
went further in constraining the controlled person’s liberty than necessary to avert the threat 
he/she was suspected of posing. Given that the challenges to control orders and TPIMs under 
Article 8 as a materially qualified Article have usually failed, it can be assumed that the same 
conclusion would be likely to be reached under Article 5 if proportionality-based analyses 
were relied on.  
 
Conclusions 
 
The use of TPIMs appears to fall outside Article 5(1) as far as the detention obligation is 
concerned under current Strasbourg jurisprudence since it appears that up to twelve hours 
house detention a day does not create a deprivation of liberty.
175
 But the impact of a 
particularly repressive combination of obligations under a specific TPIM notice, including 
restrictions that could also affect the materially qualified rights, would be more likely to be 
found to create a deprivation of liberty at Strasbourg than domestically, given that a line of 
authority at Strasbourg has more clearly recognised a concept of non-paradigm deprivation of 
liberty, not centrally focussed on physical confinement, but in terms of coercion, duration and 
the impact on normal life.
176
 
 
But it appears to be unarguable that application of a particular TPIM notice is less likely than 
an ETPIM notice to create incompatibility with Article 5. At present it is probably the case 
that ETPIM notices would be in accord with the domestic Article 5 jurisprudence on non-
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paradigm deprivations of liberty: the matter of their compliance with the Strasbourg standard 
remains in doubt.
177
 The question of compatibility between Article 5 and obligations under an 
ETPIM would appear to be dependent on the particular combination of obligations. The 
executive use of the discretion accorded under the core provisions of the ETPIM Bill 
resembles the effect of control orders since in effect it potentially redefines and minimises the 
ambit of Article 5: the obligations that could be imposed by ETPIMs might be viewed as 
avoiding the creation of a ‘deprivation of liberty’ only by relying implicitly on a narrow 
interpretation of that concept, impliedly affected by the national security context (which 
would be reflective of Austin). As discussed, Parliament and oversight bodies have accepted 
that ETPIMs have in effect already been given a reasonably clean bill of human rights health 
by the judiciary, in the control order cases. In other words, that case-law may, as argued, 
represent a ‘form of negative or suppressive constitutional dialogue’,178 in the sense that it 
allows the executive to argue for the introduction of such measures on the basis of their 
established ECHR-compatibility. But that contention relies on a domestic interpretation of 
Article 5 which diverges subtly from that adopted at Strasbourg, especially as regards the 
lack of focus on duration and coercion.  It can be concluded that the recalibration of rights 
that the domestic judges partially acquiesced in during the control orders saga may have 
obscured the potential lack of Article 5-compliance of ETPIMs. 
 
In a period of reliance on executive measures interfering with liberty, the question whether a 
‘deprivation of liberty’ refers centrally to restraint on physical liberty as in house detention, 
to which other interferences are ancillary, or to a much more amorphous, relativistic concept, 
has resonance within and beyond the terrorism context,
179
 but has not yet been fully resolved. 
The tendency currently evident in the UK to rely on non-paradigmatic interferences with 
liberty in order to avoid the necessity of seeking a derogation from Article 5 has exposed the 
imprecise standard it seems to denote.180 The varied ways of interfering with liberty now 
                                                 
177
 If a control orders case is decided at Strasbourg in future, and relies on Guzzardi in diverging from the 
domestic findings on house detention under Article 5(1) that could clearly change the situation via s2 HRA in 
relation to ETPIMs. 
178
 Fenwick & Phillipson n 7, 871; see further as regards the notion of dialogue in this context Yap, n 6. 
179
 In relation to Anti-Social Behaviour Orders, Serious Crime Prevention Orders (Serious Crime Act 2007, ss1-
41 and Scheds 1 and 2) and powers to interfere with protest: see Austin v Commissioner of Police for the 
Metropolis [2009] 1 AC 564. For comment see H. Fenwick ‘Marginalising Human Rights: Breach of the Peace, 
“Kettling”, the Human Rights Act and Public Protest’ [2009] PL 737. It is also significant within other areas of 
counter-terror law: under eg Terrorism Act 2000, Sched 7; Protection of Freedoms Act 2012, s 61.  
180
 As a result, Feldman argues, in the control orders context, that a new Protocol to the Convention, setting out 
further specified circumstances in which liberty can justifiably be infringed may be needed: D. Feldman, 
‘Deprivation of Liberty in Anti-Terrorism Law’ (2008) 67 CLJ 4, 8. 
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available to the state under TPIMs and potentially under ETPIMs render the traditional idea 
of focussing mainly on physical restraint out-dated. Tying the deprivation of liberty concept 
most strongly to that one notion marginalises it in relation to measures, such as relocation or 
bars on entering specific spaces, which may appear less repressive but can have a profound 
impact on the lives that those subject to them might otherwise have been living.
181
 
 
Article 6 issues 
 
The control orders jurisprudence on Article 6 to an extent mirrors that under Article 5 in 
terms of the journey that has been undertaken towards a greater acceptance of fair trial 
standards,
182
 but a number of the issues are not addressed in TPIMA or the ETPIMs Bill; 
rather, Article 6-compliance relies on such jurisprudence and section 3 of the HRA. In most 
TPIM (and ETPIM) cases the review hearing under section 9 of the TPIMA (which also 
applies to ETPIMs) will represent the point at which court intervention occurs; it will 
normally arise some months after the TPIM/ETPIM has been imposed by the Home 
Secretary.
183
 At the review hearing the court must apply the judicial review principles 
applicable in deciding whether the decision is flawed. In using the terminology of the PTA, it 
is assumed that the provisions will be applied subject to the interpretation imposed under 
section 3 HRA and Article 6(1).
184
 The courts apply a more exacting standard of review, 
including ‘intense scrutiny’ of the necessity for the measures imposed. 185  
 
The review hearing relies on closed and open material. A closed material procedure (CMP) is 
well established in the context of control orders/TPIMs, and has been accepted by the 
courts.
186
 The provisions governing the procedure did not derive from the PTA, and the same 
is true of TPIMA and the ETPIM Bill. The provisions are found in the Civil Procedure Rules 
                                                 
181
 The key issue in Guzzardi, text to n 102 above. It may be the case that the difference between fourteen and 
sixteen hours of house detention has less impact in terms of the life the suspect would otherwise have been 
living – the Guzzardi test – than the effects of a form of internal exile (forced relocation). 
182
 See for discussion Fenwick & Phillipson n 7 above, 886-889. 
183
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 The Government in its ECHR memos on Article 6 in relation to TPIMs and ETPIMs considers on this basis 
that the provisions relating to court review are compatible with Article 6; TPIMA ECHR memo n 28, para 24-
42, and ETPIM Bill ECHR memo, n 29, para 30-1.  
185
 The test from Secretary of State for the Home Department v MB [2006] 3 WLR 839 at [63]–[65].   
186
 Secretary of State for the Home Department v MB [2007] 1 AC 440. 
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(CPR),
187
 and that position has been unaffected by the move from control orders to the new 
measures, although CMP have been given a further legal basis under the Justice and Security 
Act 2013.
188
 The PTA case law which relied on section 3 of the HRA to seek to ensure that 
the procedure reached Article 6 standards
189
 also applies to TPIMs (and would do to 
ETPIMs).
190
 It is clear from Secretary of State for the Home Department v BC and BB
191
 that 
Article 6(1) is engaged by proceedings in relation to a TPIM: the argument was not accepted 
that the obligations imposed under ‘light touch’ control orders – similar to the obligations 
under a TPIM – do not require Article 6(1) compliance.192  
 
Although CMP are used, disclosure of the essence of the case to the suspect is required.
193
 
Thus, if the essence or gist of the case cannot be disclosed on national security grounds,
194
 the 
TPIM notice cannot be sustained. The question of the degree of disclosure required to the 
suspect has not been fully resolved, and no attempt was made to resolve it in the TPIMA or 
ETPIM provisions themselves. In AT v Secretary of State for the Home Department
195
 the 
Court of Appeal found that insufficient disclosure had occurred to satisfy Article 6. In BM
196
 
it was found that once some disclosure has occurred, the failure of the TPIM suspect to deal 
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The closed material is considered by the Special Advocate (SA). Provision is made for the 
exclusion of a relevant person and his legal representative from a hearing to secure that information is not 
disclosed contrary to the public interest: rule 76.22. The SA may only communicate with the relevant party 
before closed material is served upon him or her, save with permission of the court: rules 76.2, 76.28(2). See 
further M. Chamberlain, ‘Special Advocates and Procedural Fairness in Closed Proceedings’ (2009) 28 Civil 
Justice Quarterly 314.   
188
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 See Secretary of State for the Home Department v AF (No.3) [2009] 3 WLR 74. 
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 See the ECHR memorandum on the TPIM Bill as regards Article 6, n 28, para 29-42. The ETPIM 
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 [2010] 1 WLR 1542. See also BM v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2011] EWCA Civ 366; 
Lord Justice Thomas said at [19]: ‘..on the open evidence, the control order could not be justified as necessary at 
the time it was made as the evidence was too vague and speculative’.  
192
 It has been found that control orders affect civil rights and obligations; therefore Article 6(1)’s requirement 
of a fair hearing applies: Secretary of State for the Home Department v MB [2008] 1 AC 440, 470F.  
193
 See Secretary of State for the Home Department v AF (No.3) [2009] 3 WLR 74. This is covered by the 
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194
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 [2012] EWCA Civ 42. 
196
 [2012] EWHC 714 (Admin). 
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with the allegations to the extent that was possible, having regard to the disclosure given, 
could be taken into account in relation to the level of suspicion.
197
  
 
Use of closed material proceedings is about to leach into many other civil actions with a 
national security dimension,
198
 despite criticism of the quality of the information relied on.
199
 
That expansion of their use provides an example of a trend towards habituation and 
normalisation of measures in tension with Article 6, as is also apparent in relation to non-
trial-based measures that are able to operate outside Article 5(1).  
 
Parliamentary scrutiny 
 
Renewal  
 
Parliamentary scrutiny is reduced under TPIMA 2011 since, unlike the PTA, it will not expire 
if Parliament does not review and renew it annually, indicating the extent to which these 
measures have undergone normalisation. The House of Lords’ Select Committee on the 
Constitution questioned ‘whether it is constitutionally appropriate to place on a permanent 
basis such a scheme of extraordinary executive powers.’200 TPIMA is time-limited to five 
years under section 21 but the powers can be revived under statutory instrument for further 
five year periods
201
 so, while it might be viewed as an emergency, last resort measure, not 
only is it very likely to become a familiar feature of the counter-terror landscape,
202
 but it is 
also unlikely to receive significant scrutiny on renewal.  
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 See ETPIM Bill Joint Committee n 3 above, para 77: ‘[the Minister] confirmed the Government’s position 
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Scrutiny is similarly reduced in relation to ETPIMs, compared with control orders: in 
accordance with clause 9 of the draft ETPIM Bill, the operative provisions of the Bill only 
remain in force for one year but can be renewed or revived by order under the affirmative 
resolution procedure.
203
 Further, the Secretary of State can declare that by reason of urgency 
that procedure need not be followed,
204
 reducing the possibility of scrutiny still further.  
 
Basis for the introduction of the ETPIM Bill 
 
The Deputy Assistant Police Commissioner told the ETPIM Bill Joint Committee that 
ETPIMs could be introduced in response to a general rising of the threat level that could be 
triggered either by an increase in the danger posed by terrorists or a reduction in resources for 
policing.
205
 The Select Committee found that although the Minister in question had said that 
the resources would continue to be available, there was still uncertainty as to the types of 
‘exceptional circumstances’ that would lead to the introduction of this Bill’.206 The 
Government in its Response to the Committee
207
 declined to give an exhaustive summary of 
the trigger circumstances, but stated that they might arise where the country faced a serious 
terrorist threat that the Government  
on the advice of the police and the Security Service, judged could not be managed by 
any other means. This might include a situation where there was credible reporting 
pointing to a series of concurrent, imminent attack plots, or the period immediately 
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 Under clause 9(1) the provisions expire 12 months after the Act is passed. Under clause 9(2)(b)(i) the 
Secretary of State may, by order made by statutory instrument provide that ‘the Secretary of State’s enhanced 
TPIM powers are not to expire at the time when they would otherwise expire under subsection (1) or in 
accordance with an order under this subsection; but (ii) are to continue in force after that time for a period not 
exceeding one year’. The order must be made by the affirmative resolution procedure under clause 9(4). The 
provisions may also be repealed by order at any time, under clause 9(2)(a). Under clause 9(3) Consultation with 
(a) the independent reviewer; (b) the Intelligence Services Commissioner; and (c) the Director-General of the 
Security Service must occur before renewal. 
204
 Clause 9(5). Under clause 9(6) an order that contains such a declaration (a) must be laid before Parliament 
after being made; and (b) if not approved by a resolution of each House before the end of 40 days beginning 
with the day on which the order was made, ceases to have effect at the end of that period. But under clause 9(7) 
if it ceases to have effect that does not affect anything done in reliance on the order, or prevent the making of a 
new order. 
205
 Speaking on behalf of Association of Chief Police Officers before the ETPIM Bill Joint Committee, n 30, 
para 8, in answer to Q39, indicating that the question of the resource-intensiveness of surveillance as opposed to 
use of ETPIMs could become relevant as a trigger circumstance leading to the introduction of ETPIMs. But he 
said that ‘given the resource currently available’ and the changes made to policing, the police ‘are adequately 
managing the risk posed by people subject to TPIMs at the moment (para 21, in answer to Qs 36-39). 
206
 ‘[the Minister] was vague as to the circumstances in which the ETPIMs Bill might be introduced for 
Parliament to consider. We accept that it would be impossible to define a hard and fast ‘trigger’ for this 
legislation, but we recommend that in its response to this Report, the Government set out as clearly and 
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207
 See n 28 above.  
33 
 
following a major terrorist incident where we faced the prospect of further attacks… 
[but would probably not include] a change to the overall terrorism threat level in the 
absence of other factors.
208
  
Such uncertainty as to the trigger circumstance for introducing the Bill underpins the 
concerns that have arisen in Parliament that the legislation is being kept in the ‘back pocket’ 
to be introduced abruptly to be rushed through as emergency legislation, meaning that 
Parliament cannot debate it fully or subject the basis for introducing the Bill to meaningful 
scrutiny.
209
 The ETPIM Bill Committee suggested that members of the Intelligence and 
Security Committee could be briefed on the nature of the threat in question, and then asked to 
communicate a recommendation to Parliament as to whether the case for introduction of the 
Bill had been made.
210
 
 
The ‘investigative’ element of TPIMs and ETPIMs 
 
The TPIMs/ETPIMs schemes were put forward as resembling the control orders in their 
preventive aspect, but also as having a genuinely significant investigative element – hence the 
use of the term ‘investigation’ in the title of both instruments. The term was intended to 
emphasise the dissimilarity between these schemes and the control orders one.
211
 The 
apparent stance of the Coalition government, implicit in the use of that term, is that TPIMs 
are more closely associated with facilitating the criminal prosecution of suspects, and are 
designed to further that end, rather than being viewed as an end in themselves.  
 
The emphasis under control orders was on the isolation of the controlee, in physical and 
communicative terms; control orders barred suspects from employing technology – the 
internet, phones – to facilitate contact with certain associates, thereby preventing TRA. But 
such bars meant that data that could have been collected by way of electronic surveillance 
could not be available. Thus the use of control orders tended to be inimical to the prospects of 
prosecuting the controlees.
212
 Interference with the suspect’s use of communications 
technology is also a significant aspect of TPIMA. But, as discussed, the level of interference 
                                                 
208
 ibid paras 2 and 3.  
209
 See ETPIM Bill Joint Committee, n 3, paras 27-32. 
210
 ibid paras 37, 38. 
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 Review of Counter-Terrorism Powers Lord MacDonald, Report Cm 8003, (2011) 9.  
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was higher under control orders, and would be under ETPIMs, than it is under TPIMs. Thus – 
so the argument goes – since under a TPIM the suspect is not as isolated from possible 
associates, terrorism-related activity might occur, or past occurrences of such activity might 
be revealed, leading to the possibility of a prosecution, although obviously any potential risk 
he/she represents might thereby be enhanced. Although ETPIMs also include the term 
‘investigation’, the communicative and physical isolation created by control orders can be 
replicated under these enhanced notices. Thus the investigative element of ETPIMs is clearly 
weakened, as the government has accepted,
213
 since the placement of the suspect in a state of 
isolation from others, the aspect of the control orders scheme particularly criticised by the 
2011 review,
214
 can be recreated.  
 
Control orders contained a specific prosecutorial review element potentially linked to 
investigations, which was strengthened to an extent in TPIMA s10, also applying to 
ETPIMs.
215
 Under section 8 of the PTA the relevant chief officer of police had to keep the 
prospects of prosecution under review, consulting the CPS as necessary. Under section 10 
there is a duty to consult the Chief Officer of the appropriate police force as to the prospects 
of prosecution
216
 before imposing a TPIM or an ETPIM.
217
 The Chief Officer must consult 
the relevant prosecuting authority before responding (section 10(6)), although the duty to 
consult can be satisfied by a consultation that occurred previously (section 10(9)). This 
appears to refer to the previous consultation duty under section 8 of the PTA. The Secretary 
of State must then inform the Chief Officer that the TPIM/ETPIM notice has been served 
(section 10(4)), and he or she must keep prosecution under review for the duration of the 
notice.
218
  
 
Given that all the controlees were transferred on to TPIMs at the beginning of 2012, and there 
have been no prosecutions since then of those currently subject to TPIMs, leaving aside 
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prosecutions for breach of TPIM conditions,
219
 the danger that the review of the possibility of 
prosecution is merely part of a tokenistic, routinized, presentational exercise with no genuine 
investigative element
220
 – as it appears to have been in relation to control orders – still 
remains.
221
 That danger may have been exacerbated by the two year limit on imposition of a 
TPIM.
222
 The possibility that the two year limit might incentivise those looking for evidence 
to found a prosecution and create a stronger focus on so doing than was the case under 
control orders which could be renewed indefinitely appears remote: the time limit is more 
likely to mean that none will be found since a rational suspect is unlikely to engage in TRA 
as the end point of the TPIM comes closer, as Anderson has pointed out.
223
 
 
Conclusions  
 
It has been argued that the mere ‘forms of legality’ that might be said to have existed in the 
shape of Part 4 of the ACTSA, and to a lesser extent in the form of control orders, have come 
to comport more closely with genuine legality, in the form of TPIMs. Court action in reliance 
on the ECHR in relation to control orders brought the two closer together, and parliamentary 
action, in passing TPIMA, brought that process closer to completion. TPIMA represents a 
positive development in that it has explicitly addressed Strasbourg standards, but it has done 
so in the form of endorsing a domestic compromise between security and liberty that is in 
tension with those standards. This article has argued that reliance on this domestic 
compromise appears to have legitimized the continued use of such exceptional measures, with 
no solution, no new exit strategy allowing for their abandonment, currently available. Such 
legitimisation appears to have aided in creating some acceptance for the introduction of 
ETPIMs. 
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The problem is that in this current phase an appearance of constitutionality has been created, 
of effective dialogue between courts, executive and Parliament, which has relied on the 
ECHR standards to draw the ‘repressive sting’ of the control orders scheme.224 But as has 
been argued, the modifications to that scheme undertaken via court action failed to bring it 
into clear compliance with the Strasbourg conception of Article 5(1). As argued, such action 
did not fully discard the idea that certain rights, in particular Article 5, should exist in 
somewhat attenuated versions of themselves in this context,
225
 meaning that their ‘checking’ 
value is diminished.
226
 While such notions of attenuation have been resisted by the judges, 
the position reached at the current time remains one in which ETPIMs can appear to have the 
form of legality which, as David Dyzenhaus has argued, may be more dangerous than a 
complete lack of legality.
227
 The findings of principle emerging from the control orders 
dialogue have, as indicated, been pressed upon the judges during court challenges, on 
Parliament
228
 and on parliamentary oversight bodies,
229
 creating the impression that the 
ground rules have now been established in terms of the extent to which ECHR guarantees can 
tolerate such measures, and aiding ETPIMs in embedding themselves within the accepted 
counter-terror infrastructure. As discussed, it is possible that the Strasbourg Court might 
eventually reject the domestic version of Article 5(1) that has emerged, which legitimises 
ETPIMs, although the decision in Austin casts some doubt on that possibility. Thus at present 
the dialogue emerging from the control orders jurisprudence can be viewed as a negative one 
that is ‘suppressive’ in inviting an insidious departure from ECHR standards.    
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